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SOME ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES 
ON URBAN RENEWAL DECISIONS* 
By CHARLES R. PLOTT 
Purdue University 
Prescribing "corrective actions" for "market failures" is not a new 
activity for economists. Such corrective actions usually amount to the 
replacement of a market mechanism by some other mechanism such as 
a governmental agency charged with certain powers and responsibilities. 
Curiously enough, we know less about the behavior of these alternative 
institutional arrangements than we do about market institutions. It is 
hoped that this paper will add some insights into part of the workings of 
one such mechanism: the urban renewal program. 
Parts of the behavior of two separate political bodies within the 
urban renewal institutional framework will be examined. The first will 
be that of the federal Urban Renewal Administration (URA). The 
second will be that of the local public agency (LPA) which represents 
the community. With respect to URA it will be argued that the particu- 
lar institutional structure has influenced the locational distribution of 
urban renewal activities on one hand and the time sequence of project 
approvals on the other. With respect to the localities it will be argued 
that the institutional structure has influenced the method by which 
the local share of the project is paid. 
The central theme about the workings of a political process is drawn 
from the works of Downs,1 Tullock,2 and Wildavsky.3 Individuals with- 
in political processes must be responsive to the wishes of those who can 
control their future within the organization either directly or indirectly 
by means of financial control. Otherwise they will not survive. This 
is not really so different in principle from a market in which the seller 
must consider the tastes and alternatives of his customers if he is to 
continue as a seller. 
The Urban Renewal Administralion 
Because of the particular method of financing urban renewal (some- 
times called the "back door" method), those who have the greatest 
influence on the amount of available funds can be rather easily identi- 
fied. 
* The author wishes to thank Professor James M. Buchanan, Univ. of Virginia, and Profes- 
sor Gordon Tullock, Rice Univ., for their suggestions during the formative stages of this study. 
Parts of this paper summarize work contained in the author's unpublished dissertation, "In- 
fluences of Decision Processes on Urban Renewal," Univ. of Virginia. I Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Little, Brown and Co., 1967). 
2 Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy (Public Affairs Press, 1965). 
3 A. Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Little, Brown and Co., 1964). 
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Bills including the amount of urban renewal authorization are acted 
upon by the Congress after having passed through the banking and 
currency committees. Once the funds are authorized, however, URA 
can effectively bypass the appropriations committees and Bureau of 
the Budget for much of its financing. Limited only by the amount of 
congressional authorization, URA has the authority to sign contracts 
with local public agencies which guarantee the payment of a certain 
amount of funds at the completion of a project. These contracts can 
then be used by the locality as collateral for project financing. WVhen 
these contracts become due there is little the appropriations committee 
can do but appropriate the funds. Thus, in essence, URA has access to 
the full amount of congressional authorization. Even though this does 
not mean the appropriations committees have no control over urban 
renewal expenditure; it does mean, however, that the members of the 
banking and currency committees have a rather direct control over the 
magnitude of URA activities. 
On the basis of this institutional fact it is conjectured that the Urban 
Renewal Administration is responsive to the desires of members of the 
banking and currency committees. It is assumed that a congressman 
desires more projects and spending in his district. 
An examination of the membership of the 1964 banking and currency 
committees reveals that the 50 percent of all states which are repre- 
sented on these committees receive almost 80 percent of all urban 
renewal expenditures4 at the federal level. Population could be used 
as a reasonable explanation for this but population cannot be used 
as an explanation if it is found that urban renewal activity tends to be 
centered in congressional districts which are represented on the House 
Banking and Currency Committee. In making this comparison, several 
problems are encountered. First, the interests and influences of congress- 
men elected "at large" are not easily identified. Second, the constit- 
uents of a congressman may benefit from urban renewal projects which 
are not in his district. A representative from New York City or Phila- 
delphia may be very interested in urban renewal in his metropolitan 
area even though it is not in his district. Furthermore, the data do not 
indicate the particular congressional district of projects in metropolitan 
areas when there is more than one congressional district in that area. 
So, failure to include all projects in a particular metropolitan area which 
has more than one district as projects in which a representative from 
one of those districts would be interested, would result in an under- 
estimate of the interests of this particular representative. On the other 
hand, if all projects in a metropolitan area with more than one district 
* Project here refers to all projects for which "Part I" of the application has been approved. 
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are credited to just one member of the House, a population bias enters 
the analysis. Finally, some projects could not be assigned to a congres- 
sional district since the data source did not give the location of the 
project within the state, and other projects are located outside of the 
United States. 
Suppose, first, that members of this committee from metropolitan 
areas with more than one congressional district are directly interested 
in all projects that occur in that metropolitan area. In this case, as 
shown on Table 1, the 7 percent of the House members which are on this 
committee have a direct interest in 25 percent of all urban renewal 
expenditures. If we delete from the sample all metropolitan areas with 
more than one district and all congressmen elected "at large," we find 
that the 5 percent of such congressmen on the House Banking and 
Currency Committee receive about 10 percent of urban renewal ex- 
penditures. 
It appears that there is a relationship between membership on the 
House Banking and Currency Committee and urban renewal expendi- 
tures but both qualifications and refinements are needed. First, the 
reliability of the data is questionable.5 Second, if membership on the 
committee influences URA decisions, the relevant data are urban 
renewal expenditures at the time the districts were represented. Third, 
the Banking and Currency Committee deals with many things other 
than urban renewal. Districts which have interests in these other things 
might also be those districts which are the most likely candidates for 
urban renewal. Hence, even if there is a relationship between committee 
membership and urban renewal, the relationship may not be due to an 
"advantage" in gaining URA grants provided by committee member- 
ship. The other activities of the committee may attract districts with a 
"trelatively great" urban renewal "need." 
In order to deal with the second of these problems, one needs to con- 
sider only those expenditures which occurred in a district at the time it 
was represented. The third problem offers more complications. 
The data allow the following distinctions to be made among the 
districts: (i) the district was represented on the House Banking and 
Currency Committee at least one time during the 1949-64 period; (ii) 
the district received at least one project during the period; (iii) the 
district is not in a metropolitan area with more than one district; (iv) 
the district is located in a metropolitan area with more than one dis- 
trict. 
Assume that districts which were ever represented on the committee 
(districts which have characteristic (i)) are more likely to have economic 
5 Problems of this nature are due to changing boundaries and definitions as well as frequently 
inadequate descriptions at the sources employed. 
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TABLE 
1 
URBAN 
RENEWAL 
ACTIVITIES 
IN 
DISTRICTS 
OF 
HoUSE 
BANKING 
AND 
CURRENCY 
COMMITTEE 
MEMBERS, 
1964 
Committee 
Membership 
Number 
Dollar 
Value 
Number 
of 
members 
on 
com- 
Total 
projects 
in 
district 
or 
metropolitan 
mittee 
31 
area 
of 
committee 
members 
294 
1,025,690,541 
= 
.0712 
- 
= 
.1570 
= 
.2523 
Total 
House 
membership 
435 
Total 
projects 
1872 
4,065,128,551 
Members 
on 
com ittee 
minus 
Total 
projects 
in 
district 
or 
metropolitan 
committee 
members 
"at 
large" 
28 
area 
of 
committee 
members 
294 
1,025,690,541 
- 
= 
.0677 
= 
= 
.1739 
= 
.2689 
Members 
of 
House 
minus 
House 
413 
Total 
projects 
minus 
projects 
in 
states 
1690 
3,813,008,749 
members 
"at 
large" 
with 
only 
House 
members 
"at 
large" 
minus 
projects 
in 
areas 
not 
in 
states 
Members 
on 
committee 
minus 
Total 
projects 
in 
district 
of 
committee 
committee 
members 
"at 
members 
other 
than 
projects 
in 
metro- 
large" 
minus 
committee 
mem-
politan 
area 
of 
committee 
members
bers 
from 
metroplitan 
areas 
that 
contains 
more 
than 
one 
district 
133 
1,025,690,541 
- 
761,054,831 
with 
mo e 
than 
one 
rep sen- 
- 
- 
= 
.0945 
tative 
18 
Total 
projects 
minus 
projects 
in 
states 
1406 
3,813,008,749 
-1,192,637,852 
- 
- 
= 
.0547 
that 
contain 
only 
representatives 
"at 
Members 
of 
House 
minus 
mem- 
329 
large" 
minus 
projects 
in 
areas 
not 
in 
bers 
of 
House 
"at 
large" 
mi- 
U. 
S. 
minus 
projects 
in 
metropoli an 
264,635,710 
nus 
House 
members 
from 
areas 
containing 
more 
than 
one 
dis- 
= 
.1009 
metropolitan 
areas 
with 
mo e 
trict 
2,620,370,897 
than 
one 
representative 
Total 
projects 
in 
district 
of 
committee 
members 
other 
than 
projects 
in 
metro- 
politan 
area 
of 
committee 
member 
that 
contains 
more 
than 
one 
distr ct 
130 
264,635,710 
- 
________________________ 
= - 
_ 
= 
.0931 
.1010 
Total 
projects 
minus 
projects 
in 
states 
1396 
2,619,376,627 
that 
contain 
only 
representative 
"at 
large" 
minus 
projects 
in 
areas 
not 
in 
U. 
S. 
minus 
projects 
in 
metropoli an 
areas 
containing 
more 
than 
one 
distr ct 
minus 
projects 
"at 
large" 
in 
state 
SOURCE: 
Congressional 
Directory, 
1964; 
Urban 
Renewal 
Project 
Directory 
(Washington: 
Government 
Printing 
Office, 
Sept. 
30, 
1964). 
Detailed 
documentation 
can 
be 
supplied 
by 
author 
upon 
request. 
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characteristics which make them better candidates for urban renewal 
than districts which have never been represented. If it is assumed 
further that all districts with property (i) are equally likely candidates 
for urban renewal, then one can calculate the expected proportion of all 
spending in districts with characteristic (i) which should have occurred 
in such districts at the time of representation.6 There are variations of 
this theme. Perhaps it is more reasonable to assume that districts 
(i) A (ii) A (iii) are equally likely candidates for urban renewal. Like- 
wise, it can be assumed that districts with characteristics (i)A(ii) 
TABLE 2 
EXPECTED EXPENDITURES IN DISTRICTS AT THE TIME OF REPRESENTATION ON THE HOUSE 
BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE COMPARED WITH ACTUAL EXPENDITURES 
Expected Expenditures* in Actual Expenditures in 
Definition of Members of D During the Members of D During the 
the set of Period of Representation as Period of Representation as 
Districts "D" a Percent of Expenditures a Percent of All Expenditures 
in All Members of D in Members of D 
(i) .370 
.77t (i)A(ii)A(iii) .369 .71 
(i)A(ii)A[(iii)V(iv)] .378 .77t 
(i) The district was represented on the House Banking and Currency Committee at least 
one time during the 1949-64 period. 
(ii) The district received at least one project during the 1949-64 period. 
(iii) The district is not in a metropolitan area with more than one district. 
(iv) The district is located in a metropolitan area with more than one district. 
* Approximately. 
t These figures are the same by definition. 
A[(iii)V(iv)], or equivantly (i)A(ii) , are relatively "homogeneous" 
with respect to urban renewal "needs." This latter set is affected by the 
problems of "overrepresentation" as was explained above. 
On Table 2 the expected expenditures in districts at the time of rep- 
resentation were calculated under all of the above sets of assumptions 
and are compared with actual. In all cases it was expected that about 
37 percent of the expenditures should have occurred during the time of 
representation. However, about 70 percent of the expenditures took 
place at the time of representation. 
6 Let I D I be the number of elements in a set D of districts with the desired properties. Let 
Ri I be the number of elements in that set, RiCD, of districts which are represented on the 
committee in year i. Let Si be the expected expenditures in year i in districts contained in D 
and assume the expected expenditure is that which actually occurred. Then the expected 
expenditures during the 1949-64 period in districts of D at the time of representation is 
F,SR = E R; - i-9 I DI 
The expected proportion is 
,SR 64 F,SR /E Si. 
7If a district was ever represented, it is either in a metropolitan area with more than one 
district or it is not. 
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Even though these data support the idea that URA caters to the 
source of funds, there are alternative explanations for the statistics. 
For example, perhaps members of the committee have more insight into 
the internal functioning of URA and are thus able to advise their 
constituents on dealings with the agency. 
The Timing of Decisions 
The works of Otto Davis and others indicate that bureaus in general 
are placed in a rather peculiar situation with regard to the timing of 
decisions. Decisions made by those who provide funds to the bureau 
are usually made near the beginning of the fiscal year. The material used 
for evaluation is in part the annual statistics of the previous year's 
activities. For the bureau this means several things. First, a given bud- 
get must be allocated over a year-the bureau's activity of providing 
services does not directly provide a stream of income as is the case with 
a firm. The entire budget cannot be spent during the first part of the 
year. Otherwise, there would be no justification for employment during 
the latter part of the year and the bureau would be without funds to 
meet unforeseen contingencies such as, for example, favors for import- 
ant committee members. Yet, the bureau must spend most or all of its 
budget unless it wishes to face budgetary cuts the following year. 
All of this indicates that expenditure decisions will proceed slowly 
during the first part of the year and increase during the latter part of 
the fiscal year when more of the opportunity costs are known. 
In the case of the Urban Renewal Administration four types of 
decisions are of particular interest. Communities apply to URA for 
aid. This application shall be called an "original request." The URA 
then decides whether to approve the application or not. This decision 
will be called an "original approval." During the life of a project the 
community may decide to expand the project or it may find that the 
original grant was going to be insufficient. Regardless of the motiva- 
tion the locality sometimes decides to request more aid. This decision 
shall be called a "revised request" and approval by URA is termed 
"revised approval." The final decision which is of interest is the decision 
that the community has actually satisfactorily completed the project 
and that the funds should be disbursed. This decision is called a "dis- 
bursement." 
The nature of the actions taken on all completed projects in Region 
2 as of April, 1965, were examined. There were fifty-one projects which 
represented about 30 percent of all projects completed in the United 
States at that time. 
In support of the theory it was found that the month of June is the 
time of most decision-making activity by the URA as shown on Table 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 16:22:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
312 AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 
TABLE 
3 
DATES 
OF 
URBAN 
RENEWAL 
DECISIONS 
PERTAINING 
TO 
ALL 
COMPLETED 
PROJECTS 
IN 
REGION 
II, 
BY 
MONTH 
AND 
TYPE 
OF 
DECISION, 
APRIL, 
1965 
Month 
Type 
of 
DecisionI 
July 
Aug. 
Sept. 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
April 
May 
June 
Original 
request 
.5 
5 
11 
1 
4 
2 
3 
2 
6 
3 
2 
7 
Original 
approval 
.1 
1 
3 
4 
5 
6 
4 
1 
8 
2 
3 
14 
Revised 
request* 
.2 
3 
5 
1 
4 
5 
4 
8 
4 
12 
5 
8 
Revised 
approval 
.3 
2 
3 
4 
2 
6 
3 
6 
7 
4 
7 
11 
Disbursements 
.0 0 
2 
3 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
5 
2 
34 
Total 
... 
111 
13 
25 
11 
15 
20 
14 
| 
18 
| 
26 
| 
26 
20 
| 
74 
* 
Revised 
requests 
are 
frequently 
submitted 
together 
with 
a 
request 
for 
disbursements. 
Such 
data 
are 
not 
included 
here. 
SOURCE: 
Housing 
and 
Home 
Finance 
Agency, 
Urban 
Renewal 
Administration, 
Region 
II 
Office, 
Philadelphia. 
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3. However, during the last three months of the fiscal year almost 
one-half of all revised requests were made by the locality. This tends to 
support an argument that URA encourages communities to revise their 
requests during the latter part of the fiscal year. It appears as though 
the agency starts the year by making few decisions, and then picks up 
the pace during the latter part of the fiscal year. 
Table 4 will aid in casting additional light on this activity. The same 
fifty-one projects are represented according to the time the application 
was acted upon by URA and the percentage of the request granted by 
the URA. When URA acts during the first part of the fiscal year most 
localities are given exactly what was requested while a few are marked 
TABLE 4 
PERCENTAGE OF GRANT REQUESTS MADE DURING CERTAIN PERIODS OF THE 
YEAR THAT FALL INTO THE VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF SUCCESS. ALL 
COMPLETED PROJECTS IN REGION II, APRL, 1965* 
Percentage of Request Accepted by URA 
Period of Year Below 1.04 
.96 .98 100 1.02 above 
July, August, 
September, October. 14.28 4.76 76.19 0 4.76 ] 
November, December, 
January, February . 18.75 9.37 59.37 6.25 6.25 
March, April, 
May, June .27.65 8.51 46.80 8.51 8.51 
* Data include all decisions made on all completed projects in Region II as of April, 1965, 
other than disbursements and revised requests made for disbursement purposes. 
SOURCE: Housing and Home Finance Agency, Urban Renewal Administration, Regional 
Office II. 
down. However, when actions were taken during the latter part of the 
year the approval was likely to be for either more than was requested 
or considerably less. This supports the idea that URA is changing its 
spending criteria in order to spend the proper amount of funds. This is 
done by encouraging localities to apply for additional funds, being 
"lenient" with the good projects, and approving at reduced amounts 
projects which are really "marginal." 
If URA actually encourages applications near the end of the fiscal 
year, it must also approve those applications before the end of the 
fiscal year. And as was argued above, it will also tend to approve those 
applications with which it has been having "trouble" or those re- 
quests that have "been around" a long time. The requests are presented 
on Table 5 according to the time URA approval was received and the 
time that had elapsed since the request was made. Both as a percentage 
and in absolute terms, decisions made during the latter part of the 
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TABLE 5 
PERCENTAGE OF APPLICATIONS FOR GRANTS ACCORDING TO TIME TAKEN FOR URA 
DECISION AND ACCORDING TO PERIOD OF TIIE YEAR, APRIL, 1965* 
Number of Months Taken for URA Decision 
Period of Year 
0-3 4-7 8 and over 
4 2 2 
July-August........ -= 50. 00% - =25. 00% - =25. 00% 
8 8 8 
7 4 2 
September-October ........ - = 53.84% -=30.76% -= 15.38% 
13 13 13 
4 7 6 
November-December ...... -=23.52% -= 41.17% -= 35.29% 
17 1 7 17 
2 5 7 
January-February ......... - = 14.28% -=35.71% -=50.00% 
14 14 14 
9 2 7 
March-April .- = 50.00% -=11.11% -=38.88% 
18 18 18 
16 4 9 
May-June ................ -=55.17% -=13.79% -=31.03% 
29 29 29 
* Data include all decisions made on all completed projects in Region II as of April, 1965, 
other than disbursements and revised requests made for disbursement purposes. 
SOURCE: Housing and Home Finance Agency, Urban Renewal Administration, Regional 
Office II. 
fiscal year tend to be made on either "very recent" applications or 
"very old" applications. Presumably the recent applications were those 
sought by the agency and the old applications are the marginal cases. 
Of course, these data "prove" nothing. In fact, given the nature of 
the conjectures, it is difficult to imagine what type of data would pro- 
vide an adequate test. Nevertheless, the observations are strongly in 
agreement with the conjecture that the way urban renewal decisions 
are made strongly affects those decisions. 
The Local Decision 
The third decision process within the urban renewal framework which 
is of interest is that used by the locality. Generalizing about the deci- 
sion process at the local level is even more difficult than at the federal 
level. There are many different processes which vary according to states 
and even according to the localities within states. Because of this diver- 
sity, the best way to describe the local decision process is in terms of the 
exhaustive set of channels, instruments, or actions open to an antagonist 
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(someone against urban renewal) to change, modify, or "kill" a pro- 
posal. This set is defined by the institutional framework of the decision 
process and may contain such elements as a "public referendum," 
or "pressure on a city planning commission which has veto powers," 
etc. Since this set is exhaustive, it represents the set of "hurdles" that 
advocates must overcome in order to be a successful coalition. 
If the set of hurdles contains the element "unanimous rule," no 
change could take place unless the set of antagonists is empty. The pro- 
cess of choosing a proposal is, of course, logrolling, and the nature of the 
set of hurdles indicates the types of compromises that might be made in 
the system while a successful coalition is being formed. 
With respect to urban renewal decisions, the number and nature of 
hurdles differ between states and sometimes between communities 
within states. In general, they can be classified as: the creation of a 
local public agency; the formulation of an urban renewal plan; the 
financing of a plan; and the acceptance of a plan. 
The first hurdle that stands in the way of urban renewal advocates at 
the local level is the declaration by the community of a need for urban 
renewal and the establishment of a local public agency (LPA). This 
action, in several states, can only be done by the authority of a public 
referendum.8 Other states, with a few exceptions,9 stipulate that this 
can be done by a majority of the local governing body. 
It appears that a referendum requirement for the establishment of 
an LPA would be no harder for "advocates" to overcome than a re- 
quirement that such measures must be passed by an elected local govern- 
ing body. Mayors and city councils, if indifferent to the program itself, 
would simply try to do what the majority of their electorate wanted. A 
public referendum would simply make more accurate the estimation of 
the wishes of a majority. In the absence of a referendum a local public 
official could just as easily overestimate the number against the pro- 
gram as underestimate. Likewise, if the local public official was not 
indifferent, personally, toward urban renewal, he could be an advocate 
just as easily as he could be an antagonist. Furthermore, it would be 
just as easy for antagonists to influence the few individuals of a city 
council as the advocates. Neither is furnished with an existing orga- 
nization or a subsidized source of funds with which to organize them- 
8 California requires a majority vote for the establishment of an LPA (after July, 1961). 
This is also a requirement in the states of Maine, Mississippi (after 1962), Missouri (in towns 
with populations less than 75,000), Nebraska (in towns with populations less than 150,000), 
New Hampshire (in "towns"), Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. 
Florida and New York require that a special state legislative act is needed before any city, 
town, or municipality can exercise urban renewal powers. Illinois requires that communities 
must have the approval of the State Housing Board before exercising the powers while Wiscon- 
sin requires that the local governing body must pass such approval by a two-thirds vote rather 
than a majority. 
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selves. So, there is no a priori reason to expect either to be successful. 
A referendum requirement does increase costs to both advocates and 
antagonists to the extent that they now need not only persuade and 
inform the governing body but also the class of indifferent people. In 
another sense, however, referendum requirements reduce coalition costs. 
Except to the extent that the class of indifferent people can be influ- 
enced, there is no need for forming a coalition. The coalitions form auto- 
matically at the ballot box. This implies that there is no need for advo- 
cates or antagonists to identify themselves to each other. Each indi- 
vidual can simply express his preferences when he votes. 
The second major hurdle is the preparation of a plan. The impor- 
tance should not be underemphasized. The plan is the actual motion 
which is to be accepted or rejected. It is by the plan that the actual 
basket of goods representing various concessions from all parties which 
take place in a logrolling process are represented. The individuals who 
control the plan actually control the alternatives faced by the decision- 
makers. In effect, those who control the alternatives faced by the 
decision-maker control the decision. Decision-makers who do not have 
the authority to make amendments to proposals or make alternative 
proposals actually do not control the variables which they are supposed 
to control as decision-makers. They can be placed in a situation similar 
to an "all or none" situation in the theory of demand. It is important 
to note the means by which proposed plans can be amended. 
In most cases it is the primary responsibility of the LPA to prepare 
the urban renewal plan. If no other individuals in the community have 
the authority to amend this plan without the consent of the LPA, the 
advocates are placed in a very strong position since it is likely that the 
LPA members are strong advocates. State laws are unclear on this 
point. 
Means for altering proposed plans, other than by direct amendment 
by the local goverining body, frequently exist. For example, pressure 
might be applied through a city planning commission or similar agency. 
In some states a city planning commission has considerable authority 
over both the area to be redeveloped and the characteristics of the pro- 
posed urban renewal project.'0 Other states either do not require recom- 
mendations from a planning commission, or, if such recommendations 
are required, they are not binding. 
It may be possible to pressure members of the LPA itself. The LPA 
serves under, or perhaps consists of, a board of supervisors. This board 
controls all employment within the LPA and it is with the members of 
10 California and Maine require that the plan be certified by the city planning commission. 
Failure of the commission to approve the plan necessitates a two-thirds vote of the city council 
for acceptance of the plan. States requiring the approval of the planning commission as a neces- 
sary condition for the initiation of the plan are Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, and Pennsyl- 
vania. 
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the board that the authority of the LPA rests. If local decision-makers 
are unable to exert pressure on this group, either directly or through its 
own decision process to amend plans, a major source of compromise is 
eliminated. 
The most obvious way that a decision-maker can exert pressures 
directly on the board for amendments to a plan is by the threat of 
removal. This alternative, however, is not open in all states. This also 
differs according to whether the local public agency is a housing au- 
thority or an urban renewal agency. In most instances the board is 
appointed by either the mayor or the local governing body, and those 
who appoint are able to remove. This pattern is not consistent, how- 
ever. In some states the LPA officials can be removed only by the 
governor or a state board of housing in case the LPA is a housing 
authority." In two states, the state can appoint and remove at least one 
member of a redevelopment agency,12 and in one state, Indiana, all 
removals are made by the circuit judge. As a result, one can expect that 
LPA's in areas where the mayor or the local governing body have little 
ability to remove the officers from their positions, the local decision- 
makers have much less latitude over the range of alternatives they face 
with respect to urban renewal. 
Finally, the advocates must get the approval of the decision-makers. 
Generally, there are two basic ways "approval" of an urban renewal 
plan is given. First, the state law may stipulate that the local governing 
body, itself, has the authority to approve transactions and activities of 
the LPA without resorting to a public referendum. A referendum is the 
second method of approval.13 
If no public referendum is required, some definite implications can be 
deduced. Lack of the need of a public referendum establishes a decided 
advantage for the advocates. 
Unlike the period during the establishment of the LPA, when the 
pressures on the local governing body were symmetrical, after the 
establishment of the LPA no such symmetry exists. The reason for this 
lies in the costs of decision making. For a group to identify themselves, 
to get together and to make a collective decision, requires funds, 
organization, etc. These institutions, however, are activities of a 
public nature. That is, the institution for making decisions is itself 
a type of collective good which the market, when left to its own pro- 
cesses, will leave in insufficient supply.'4 Such an institution is estab- 
11 Illinois, Delaware, Georgia, Massachusetts (one member is appointed by the State Hous- 
ing Board), New Jersey (one member is appointed by the state director of housing). 
12 Illinois and New Jersey. 
13 States requiring a public referendum for all urban renewal projects are Mississippi, 
Montana, and Vermont. 
14 This point was made by Mancur Olson, Jr., "Discussion Paper," A.E.R., May, 1964, 
p. 251. 
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lished and financed by the locality for the advocates in terms of the 
local public agency. No such institution exists for the antagonists. 
Thus, the establishment of the LPA creates for those who desire the 
program an advantage in getting any particular proposal accepted. 
If no referendum is required, those who are antagonists must invest 
funds, not only in communicating with the governing body, but also 
in finding each other for the purposes of forming a coalition which can 
present a position and objection to the governing body. They must 
invest in showing the governing body that they are a majority, and 
this requires knowing who are antagonists. This requires investments. 
If a referendum is required, no such investment is necessary. 
It should be pointed out that there are two separate effects. Once 
the local public agency is established there is created an advantage for 
the advocates. This is due to "coalition costs" being furnished by the 
government. Regardless of the method of approval, by referendum or 
by ordinance, this advantage remains. A referendum, however, reduces 
coalition costs to the antagonists relative to the advocates. 
The method of approval often depends on how the project is financed. 
If certain types of noncash grants are used as payment for the local 
share of net project cost, the project to be constructed on the area might, 
itself, require authorization by referendum only. Several states require 
a public referendum on all bond issues. This requirement can differ 
between communities and according to the purpose of the issue. If the 
means of financing the project are subject to a referendum, a good 
chance arises for the antagonists to exert their influences and gain con- 
cessions, if not kill the complete program. 
Even though the existence of referendum requirements for bond issues 
may not completely stop an urban renewal program, it may put an- 
tagonists in a relatively strong bargaining position; thus necessitating 
considerable concessions on the part of the advocates. If a strategy is 
available to the advocates which would avoid the necessity of a referen- 
dum, they would certainly adopt it. 
This reasoning implies, also, that where no public referendum is 
necessary, the program should more nearly approximate the wishes of 
the advocates those of the community with the strongest urban re- 
newal preferences. Here we can get some idea of what the tastes of 
strong advocates might be. 
The local share of an urban renewal project can be paid by means of 
cash grant or a noncash grant. The noncash grant can be in terms of 
site improvements such as streets, sidewalks, sewers, planning, housing, 
etc., or public utilities such as parks, schools, playgrounds, parking 
lots, civic centers, bridges, etc. It can be argued that strong urban 
renewal advocates would be more likely to pay for the project with 
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cash or site improvements rather than utilities of a more "public" 
nature. So, if a referendum is required, it would seem more likely that 
the local share would be paid in terms of "public works" as opposed to 
cash or "site improvements." 
A hypothesis of this nature was tested. Data from all applications 
submitted to the Regional Office Number II, for which Part I of the 
Loan and Grant Contract has been approved by April 25, 1965, were 
collected. The projects were divided into those for which a public refer- 
endum of some type was required and those which faced no such con- 
straint.15 For each project, the amount that actually must be raised by 
the community was calculated. This means that state contributions, 
land donations, and tax credits were deducted from the local share. This 
remaining amount was either paid out of increased taxes, general reve- 
nue funds, capital improvements budgets, or bond issues. If a referen- 
dum of any type was required for the raising of the funds, the project 
was classified as one on which a vote occurred. 
After the funds were raised, they could pay for the project with cash, 
project improvements, and demolition grants, or the construction of 
some type of public utility. The hypothesis states that if a vote is 
required, the funds would not be used as cash or site improvements. 
Rather, the funds would be used for the provision of some type of public 
utility. 
For each project, the percentage of the funds raised by the locality 
which was used as a cash payment was computed. The percentage of the 
funds raised by the locality which was used for the provision of public 
utilities was computed. The results are shown on Table 6. For the 
average project on which a vote was required, 43 percent of the local 
requirements were met by the construction of a public utility. For the 
average project on which no vote was required, 18.5 percent of the local 
requirement was paid by constructing public utilities. The median per- 
centage paid by projects on which a vote was required was 35 percent 
as opposed to less than 5 percent for those on which there was no vote. 
On the basis of this result, it can be argued that where the local 
public agencies are able to avoid public referendums, there is less need 
for them to attach urban renewal to some form of public utility in order 
to get the program passed. Where there exist referendum requirements, 
a successful proposal must be one which makes greater concessions to 
individuals who have relatively weak urban renewal preferences. Urban 
16 The question of the reliability of the data cannot be overemphasized. The reports that 
were submitted to the re-ional office were oftcn unclear as to different referendum requirements 
and actions. Where there was no in(lication of referendum requirements, the datum was elimi- 
nated. However, if there was some type of plausibility for one or the other categories, the 
datum was cl.k-ssified. Only a questionnaire to each community could really establish a good 
classification. This, however, was not done. 
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TABLE 6 
PROJECTS DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING TO PERCENT OF LOCAL SHARE PAID BY MEANS OF THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND ACCORDING TO VOTE REQUIREMENTS, 1965 
Number of Projects 
Percent of Local Share Vote No Vote Paid in the Form of Required Required 
Public Utilities ________ Required 
Number % Total Number % Total 
5 36 34.9 55 59.2 
10 4 3.8 3 3.2 
15 1 1.0 1 6.4 
20 3 2.9 2 2.2 
25 4 3.8 1 1.1 
30 2 1.9 5 5.3 
35 3 2.9 1 1.1 
40 4 3.8 2 2.2 
45 5 4.8 1 1.1 
50 2 1.9 3 3.2 
55 1 1.0 4 4.4 
60 3 2.9 2 2.2 
65 4 3.8 1 1.1 
70 3 2.9 2 2.2 
75 4 3.8 0 0 
80 3 2.9 1 1.1 
85 4 3.8 1 1.1 
90 2 1.9 1 1.1 
95 3 2.9 0 0 
100 12 11.6 2 2.2 
Totals .................. 103 99.2 93 100.4 
Mean . .43.0 18.5 
Population Mean .......... 31 .3 
renewal will be accepted by these individuals as a "free good" which 
accompanies the construction of public utilities, but they are unwilling 
to make cash outlays for urban renewal alone. Thus, little cash is used 
as payment for those programs where a referendum is required. 
Summary 
Part of the problem of attempting to analyze nonmarket decision 
processes is that of abstracting from the maze of institutional facts and 
associated variables those that seem to characterize the process. In this 
respect it was argued that the institutional framework of the urban 
renewal program influences urban renewal decisions in the following 
way: (1) districts represented on the House Banking and Currency 
Committee are favored; (2) URA changes its criteria for project ap- 
provals according to the time of the year; (3) the lack of referendum 
requirements for individual projects at the local level favors the es- 
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tablishment of urban renewal; (4) referendum requirements on projects 
at the local level influence the nature and purpose of the projects. 
On the qualifications side it is sufficient to say that the shortcomings 
of the data are severe. Further, there is really no postulated theory of 
quantitative relationships among the variables. As a result, the most 
that can be said at this point is that the conjectures are suficiently 
supported to warrant further investigation. 
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